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This article refers to plans for the incorporation and development of special or secret weapons in Imperial Japan during the first part of the Showa era, for the Second Sino-Japanese war and World War II, that were originally hidden from public knowledge to protect their efficacy. Weapons prohibited by the Geneva Protocol were of specific interest to Japan, since it was thought that if a weapon was banned then it must be particularly effective. The United States and Germany are more famous for their development of special weapons, but Japan and Russia to a lesser extent both pursued weapons development. The weapons developed by Japan included biological, chemical, and advanced conventional weapons. A diverse cross section of institutions and individuals in wartime Japan participated in various areas of development, such as The Munitions Ministry (Japan), the Tokyo Imperial University, the ''Riken'' (Japanese Institute of Physics and Chemical Research), the Black Dragon Society, the Mitsubishi business conglomerate, and the Nakajima Company. Military units involved included the ''Kempeitai'', First Tachikawa Army Arsenal, Sagami Army Arsenal, and Yokosuka Naval Arsenal. ==Japanese army interests in development of secret weapons== With the reinforcement of the defenses of the homeland, a strong desire arose within Imperial General Headquarters to improve the military situation by the invention of Special or Secret weapons for decisive combat. In order to apply science to military problems, from every aspect, IGHQ therefore appealed to scholars and technical experts for their co-operation. Among the various assorted types of such weapons intended for decisive battle, the Japanese Army made efforts to put infra-red radiation to practical use. They tried to perfect heat-seeking bombs, in order to sink American troopships, with a 100% certainty of kill. This was expected to retrieve Japan's fortunes in one fell swoop. In mid-1944, experimentation with these projectiles was carried out near Lake Hamana, in co-operation with many scholars and technicians. Difficult problems appeared in succession, however, requiring resolution, and the bombs could not be put to practical use. Other secret weapons were evaluated with similar results. Since the war situation was coming to a head before the completion of thermal-ray weapons, IGHQ was obliged to rely upon ramming techniques: Suicide ships or "special-attack" planes which could be easily produced in large numbers. Weapons for decisive combat thus came to mean suicidal expedients. Another project—this one slightly more successful—was the Fire balloon (''fūsen bakudan''), a paper-enveloped hydrogen balloon carrying a small bomb, which actually could reach the United States by taking advantage of the jet stream, which the Japanese were the first to discover. For six months starting in November 1944, the Japanese Army's Special Balloon Regiment released balloons (totaling some 9,000). The object was not necessarily to inflict casualties but to damage morale in the U.S.. In practice little damage was caused, only six people killed and forest fires started. The Japanese were convinced the campaign did no damage due to the suppression of news of the balloons. At Japanese Army schools, the students were not very well trained in science and technology. Infantry remained the backbone of the Japanese Army, as in olden days. Spiritual strength was considered to be the primary element in the acquisition of victory. With the deterioration in the war situation, there was a growing desire within military circles to perfect miraculously effective weapons. Nevertheless, it became abundantly clear that the low scientific level of the nation could not possibly yield elaborate weapons. Thus, during the course of the war, the gap between the Japanese and the American scientific potential for national defense grew ever wider with the passage of time. Weaknesses in national science were certainly a major factor in Japan's loss of the war, but poorness and neglect of science were not attributable to the Japanese Army alone. It may well have been because the Japanese adopted principles of makeshift expediency ever since the Meiji era. The Japanese Army's attitude toward technology incurred many kinds of great criticism from private sources at the time, the major points being the following: *The Japanese Army keeps matters tightly secret. *The Japanese Army has a great predilection for bamboo-spear tactics, and has little understanding of technology. *Owing to a plethora of research facilities, there is no clear definition of individual responsibility. *The right technical experts are not assigned to the right posts, since the Japanese Army's own technicians are put in charge of the units; etc. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Secret and special weapons in Showa Japan」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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